Fourth, in coordination with these other cyber activities, Russian agencies are conducting global cyber influence operations to support their war efforts. These combine tactics developed by the KGB over several decades with new digital technologies and the internet to give foreign influence operations a broader geographic reach, higher volume, more precise targeting, and greater speed and agility. Unfortunately, with sufficient planning and sophistication, these cyber influence operations are well- positioned to take advantage of the longstanding openness of democratic societies and the public polarization that is characteristic of current times.
As the war in Ukraine has progressed, Russian agencies are focusing their cyber influence operations on four distinct audiences. They are targeting the Russian population with the goal of sustaining support for the war effort. They are targeting the Ukrainian population with the goal of undermining confidence in the country’s willingness and ability to withstand Russian attacks. They are targeting American and European populations with the goal of undermining Western unity and deflecting criticism of Russian military war crimes. And they are starting to target populations in nonaligned countries, potentially in part to sustain their support at the United Nations and in other venues.
Russian cyber influence operations are building on and are connected to tactics developed for other cyber activities. Like the APT teams that work within Russian intelligence services, Advance Persistent Manipulator (APM) teams associated with Russian government agencies act through social media and digital platforms. They are pre-positioning false narratives in ways that are similar to the pre-positioning of malware and other software code. They are then launching broad-based and simultaneous “reporting” of these narratives from government-managed and influenced websites and amplifying their narratives through technology tools designed to exploit social media services. Recent examples include narratives around biolabs in Ukraine and multiple efforts to obfuscate military attacks against Ukrainian civilian targets.
As part of a new initiative at Microsoft, we are using AI, new analytics tools, broader data sets, and a growing staff of experts to track and forecast this cyber threat. Using these new capabilities, we estimate that Russian cyber influence operations successfully increased the spread of Russian propaganda after the war began by 216 percent in Ukraine and 82 percent in the United States.
These ongoing Russian operations build on recent sophisticated efforts to spread false COVID-19 narratives in multiple Western countries. These included state-sponsored cyber influence operations in 2021 that sought to discourage vaccine adoption through English-language internet reports while simultaneously encouraging vaccine usage through Russian-language sites. During the last six months, similar Russian cyber influence operations sought to help inflame public opposition to COVID-19 policies in New Zealand and Canada.
[…]
We’re concerned that many current Russian cyber influence operations currently go for months without proper detection, analysis, or public reporting. This increasingly impacts a wide range of important institutions in both the public and private sectors. And the longer the war lasts in Ukraine, the more important these operations likely will become for Ukraine itself. This is because a longer war will require sustaining public support from the inevitable challenge of greater fatigue. This should add urgency to the importance of strengthening Western defenses against these types of foreign cyber influence attacks.
Om noen funderte på sammenhengen mellom enkeltes standpunkter i forskjellige tråder:
Sist redigert:
Om Wagner og piloter.
www.vg.no
"Russia is the storm, but China will be the climate change."
Spennende, og de russiske styrkene i Kherson blir også angrepet av de sivile i byen
Russland har tatt ut 1000 artilleri i løpet av en dag...
Jeg har virkelig sans for de nye, russiske Bumerang-missilene!
Et fåfengt håp, det kommer aldri til å gå i Ukrainas favørSist redigert:
en.wikipedia.org
Sist redigert:Håpet om at Putler skal gi seg m Ukraina et dårlig håp. Les hva han publiserer, se hva han gjør
