Girkin/Strelkov har hatt ett opphold ved fronten og rapporterer følgende på sin Telegram kanal.
I am in Moscow. Attempt No. 3 to take a direct part in the hostilities against the armed forces of respected Kyiv partners (they are now referred to in the reports of the Ministry of Defense as some kind of "militants") did not end in success, although it was very close to that.
Briefly, without details:
So, having arrived (as agreed) at the end of the first ten days of October on the territory of the DPR, on the 14th, I appeared at one of the military commissariats of the republic, where I wrote a statement asking for voluntary mobilization of myself into the ranks of the DPR Armed Forces. On the same day, he was enlisted in the marching company of the N-th motorized rifle brigade of the 1st corps of the NM of the DPR for subsequent assignment to the N-th battalion of the N-th rifle regiment. Received the corresponding temporary certificate. (Supplied). During a number of working trips, I visited Donetsk several times. I was (unofficially) informed that the "inconsistent" enrollment in the NM of the DPR caused dissatisfaction with the "higher command", but they assured me that this issue "would be resolved over time", but for now I will fulfill my duties, formally holding the position of private (which suited me quite well, since the choice between "checkers and go" was initially made in favor of "go", and I was not going to apply for command positions and related preferences and regalia).
Further, after a rather long stay at the military training ground as the acting chief of staff of the battalion being formed, in November he left with a group of battalion fighters to the area where the main forces of the N regiment were located in the area of Svatovo, where he tried to carry out the duties of the beginning for a little more than 10 days. battalion headquarters regarding preparations for its upcoming combat use at the front. The location of the unit was within the range of enemy field artillery fire, however, during my stay it was never subjected to shelling (although attacks on this NP and its environs were repeatedly made earlier).
After that, he again departed, first to the location of the PPD of the N-th brigade and then to the training ground.
As part of the performance of the duties of the NSh battalion, at the end of November, I found out with some bewilderment that not only did I not hold a position in my battalion, but I was not at all listed in the states of the N regiment. Trying further to understand my status, I quickly established that I was also long gone from the lists of the personnel of the N-th brigade (in the marching company of which I entered upon enrollment).
Further informal investigation allowed, in general terms, to establish the following:
- shortly after being enrolled in the marching company, I was transferred to the N-th regiment, in which I was enrolled for exactly one day (in the morning I was listed, in the evening I was taken out without a trace). All these manipulations (probably done under pressure "from above") were not formalized by any orders.
- as a result, from October to the end of November, I was illegally in the N-th battalion of the N-th regiment, illegally carried weapons and ammunition, illegally traveled to the area of the NMD and to the frontline zone. If something happened to me during these trips, then ... should I explain that it would be represented exclusively by the "amateur activity of the adventurer Girkin" or (at best) by an accident during "volunteer activities"? - With a corresponding complete lack of obligations on the part of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation / DPR and the state in relation to me.
- the command of the N-th regiment and battalion knew about all this, but - receiving very solid assistance for their unit (food, equipment, vehicles, funds for fuel, the flow of volunteers, etc.) due to my stay in the regiment and battalion, - They preferred not to tell me.
The establishment of all these circumstances made my further stay in the N regiment impossible. And since I was in it (as indicated above), it turns out, I was not formally involved in any way - I just had to hand over the machine gun, pistol, grenades and ammunition illegally issued to me (since the battalion is not at the front and even in the frontline zone and it is not known when it will be there and whether it will turn out at all), settle pressing issues with undistributed equipment and humanitarian aid, as well as volunteers (most of them were redirected - together with "Prapor" - to combat units and subunits with more adequate, responsible and competent command) and depart where I see fit. Which is what I have done. I returned to Moscow late last night.
And now also briefly on the impressions of the trip, which was inconclusive, but not useless (since my eyes and ears remained with me, and my head is also still working).
Naturally, I intend to keep the vast majority of my impressions and conclusions to myself. To, so to speak, "not to discredit". Positive impressions - I will share in the upcoming (hopefully) video conferences. But there are not too many of them - in relation to the negative ones.
And now I will only note that the basis of all our "increasing victories" on the fronts and directions of the NMD is the deepest crisis of strategic planning. Simply put, the troops are fighting "by inertia", not having the slightest idea of the ultimate strategic goals of the current military campaign and only guessing about the vague plans of the command for such grandiose senseless gestures as the construction of a completely insane in uselessness (but wildly expensive in terms of execution cost) Surovikin Lines.
In most parts of the RF Armed Forces, soldiers and officers do not understand: for what, for what and for what purposes they are fighting in general. For them, a mystery - what is the condition for victory or just a condition for ending the war? And the authorities of the Russian Federation are not able to explain this to them, since setting a clear goal for the NWO means "limiting room for maneuver" - that is, losing the opportunity to declare the goals of the NWO as achieved at any moment that the Kremlin leaders consider convenient. (For the thousand and first time, I remind you that the passionately desired “reconciliation with partners,” for which many steps are being taken to this day that demoralize society and the army, is unattainable in principle, but the Kremlin and Staraya Square do not want to believe in it).
Such sentiments specifically in the troops lead to apathy. Apathy, on the other hand, leads to a drop in morale and the fulfillment of the tasks set "for show" and "slip of the sleeves", without a real interest in their successful result. So - in the army of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (and parts of the Armed Forces of the LDNR, although there the fighters have much more motivation) apathy prevails.
The absence of a clear military-political strategy does not allow the military to develop tactics that will contribute to its implementation. In the meantime - "on a whim" - the RF Armed Forces are preparing for a protracted positional war, building long-term structures along the entire front in the style of "a la the Mannerheim Line" (it does not pull on the "Maginot Line"). The fact that following the strategy of a protracted war is suicide for the Russian Federation (and its authorities and elites, too, by the way) - I wrote back in 2014, but I said (more than once or twice) - from the very beginning of the current campaign.
Therefore, watching how the enemy slowly (and without encountering any opposition) implements his own strategic tasks with the complete passivity of the military and political authorities of the Russian Federation, I do not expect anything good at the front in the coming weeks.
And, yes, - the so-called. "Ukraine" will NOT freeze in winter, will NOT rebel and will NOT fight worse. Vice versa. Its soldiers, who have already believed in their strength as a result of the autumn victories of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and are fully supported by NATO, will only fight harder and harder against the "Muscovites", avenging the hardships that their relatives and friends in the rear are forced to bear. And they will be met only by apathetic performance of duty, behind which many fighters and commanders have long been looming the unresolved question: "What are we doing here, if Moscow is most concerned with the implementation of" grain deals ", the unhindered pumping of ammonia through Odessa and the" price ceiling " on gas and oil supplied to numerous Western partners?
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