I stedet for å være en vesentlig aktør i et EU som posisjonerer seg for å spille en stadig viktigere rolle i verden, blir de sittende på sin lille øy som en halvstor makt og feire sin "selvstendighet", som de ikke kan bruke til noe som helst av særlig betydning.
Brexiteers var søte da de mente at de kunne erstatte EU med handel med Commonwealth.
Bak betalingsmur:
When Brexiters cast around for plausible candidates to replace the trade that will be lost with the EU, the British
Commonwealth is generally quite high up the list. The idea has been aired at this week’s meeting of the organisation’s heads of government in London. In reality, such plans are highly quixotic. Not only is the simple arithmetic of the economies involved highly unfavourable but, unlike the EU, the Commonwealth does not come remotely close to forming a trade bloc with which the UK can have a single relationship.
The UK exports
nearly five times as much to the EU than to the Commonwealth. Most of the countries involved are small; almost all of them are far from the UK. Whatever
Liam Fox, the trade secretary, might tell us about a post-geography world, proximity
still matters in trade.
Moreover, the great attraction of the EU is as an integrated single bloc. Companies acquire not just access to the world’s second-biggest consumer market, but also the chance to knit into fast and sophisticated supply chains.
The Commonwealth, by contrast, does not function as a trading area. Some credulous commentators place faith in a “Canzuk” bloc emerging, including Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK. But Canada’s most important trading partner by far is the US, and its regulation and trade policy are oriented towards its southern neighbour. Australia and New Zealand are closely aligned with each other, but beyond that they are far more concerned with China and other Asian markets than with English-speaking countries on the far side of the world.
The UK’s decision to join the European Economic Community in 1973 dealt a sharp blow to the likes of New Zealand, which had enjoyed privileged access to the British market. But in truth a global trading bloc anchored on the UK was already disappearing. The “sterling area” of fixed exchange rates that had facilitated trade within the British empire had been severely weakened when the UK was forced to devalue the pound in 1967.
Thereafter, the Commonwealth as a meaningful trading area began to cease to exist. The advanced economies turned to other markets. Poorer countries, particularly in Africa, retain access to the UK through preferential EU trade agreements, but have relatively little to sell. The UK can hope to do little more than replicate those EU deals. The biggest non-UK Commonwealth economy, India, is emerging only slowly from the protectionist crouch it maintained for decades after independence in 1947.
None of these offers much hope for the UK trying to use the opportunity of Brexit to crack open new markets. Canada, apart from its Nafta and Trans-Pacific Partnership commitments, has already signed a bilateral deal with the EU, which the UK will be scrambling to replicate. The same is likely to be true of Australia and New Zealand, which are just starting talks with Brussels.
India dislikes signing meaningful trade deals with anyone, and bilateral talks with the EU have been stalled for years. Ironically,
Brexit means New Delhi is marginally more likely to be able to get an agreement with the remaining EU27, as two of the biggest stumbling-blocks — Indian tariffs on whisky and EU visas to let Indian professionals work in Europe — mainly involved the UK.
Whatever affection certain Britons might have for their far-flung former colonies, the idea that they are a replacement for doorstep access to one of the world’s biggest markets is fanciful. The Commonwealth may have some uses. A replacement for the European trading partners the UK will lose after Brexit is not among them.
Deals with disparate economies cannot replace the EU single market
www.ft.com