G
Gjestemedlem
Gjest
Du får gruble litt på denne, og kanskje samtidig også hvorfor SD nå er landets største parti.
Diskusjonstråd Se tråd i gallerivisning
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GGjestemedlem
Gjest
The Great Inversion
The Great Inversion | Armed and Dangerous
There’s a political trend I have been privately thinking of as “the Great Inversion”. It has been visible since about the end of World War II in the U.S., Great Britain, and much of Western Europe, gradually gaining steam and going into high gear in the late 1970s.
The Great Inversion reached a kind of culmination in the British elections of 2019. That makes this a good time, and the British elections a good frame, for explaining the Great Inversion to an American audience. It’s a thing that is easier to see without the distraction of transient American political issues.
(And maybe I have an easier time seeing the pattern because I lived in Great Britain as a child. British politics is more intelligible to me than to most Americans because of that early experience.)
To understand the Great Inversion, we have to start by remembering what the Marxism of the pre-WWII Old Left was like — not ideologically, but sociologically. It was an ideology of, by, and for the working class.
Now it’s 2019 and the Marxist-rooted Labor party in Great Britain is smashed, possibly beyond repair. It didn’t just take its worst losses since 1935, it was eviscerated in its Northern industrial heartland, losing seats to the Tories in places that had been “safe Labor” for nigh on a century.
Exit polls made clear what had happened. The British working class, Labor’s historical constituency, voted anyone-but-Labor. Only in South Wales and a handful of English cities with large immigrant populations was it able to cling to power. In rural areas the rout was utter and complete.
To understand the why of this I think it’s important to look beyond personalities and current political issues. Yes, Jeremy Corbyn was a repulsive figure, and that played a significant role in Labor’s defeat; yes, Brexit upended British politics. But if we look at the demographics of who voted Labor, it is not difficult to discern larger and longer-term forces in play.
Who voted Labor? Recent immigrants. University students. Urban professionals. The wealthy and the near wealthy. People who make their living by slinging words and images, not wrenches or hammers. Other than recent immigrants, the Labor voting base is now predominantly elite.
This is the Great Inversion – in Great Britain, Marxist-derived Left politics has become the signature of the overclass even as the working class has abandoned it. Indeed, an increasingly important feature of Left politics in Britain is a visceral and loudly expressed loathing of the working class.
To today’s British leftist, the worst thing you can be is a “gammon”. The word literally means “ham”, but is metaphorically an older white male with a choleric complexion. A working-class white male, vulgar and uneducated – the term is never used to refer to men in upper socio-economic strata. And, of course, all gammons are presumed to be reactionary bigots; that’s the payload of the insult.
Catch any Labor talking head on video in the first days after the election and what you’d see is either tearful, disbelieving shock or a venomous rant about gammons and how racist, sexist, homophobic, and fascist they are. They haven’t recovered yet as I write, eleven days later.
Observe what has occurred: the working class are now reactionaries. New Labor is entirely composed of what an old Leninist would have called “the revolutionary vanguard” and their immigrant clients. Is it any wonder that some Laborites now speak openly of demographic replacement, of swamping the gammons with brown immigrants?
It would be entertaining to talk about the obvious parallels in American politics – British “gammons” map straight to American “deplorables”, of course, and I’m not even close to first in noticing how alike Donald Trump and Boris Johnson are – but I think it is more interesting to take a longer-term view and examine the causes of the Great Inversion in both countries.
It’s easy enough to locate its beginning – World War II. The war effort quickened the pace of innovation and industrialization in ways that are easy to miss the full significance of. In Great Britain, for example, wartime logistical demands – especially the demands of airfields – stimulated a large uptick in road-making. All that infrastructure outlasted the war and enabled a sharp drop in transport costs, with unanticipated consequences like making it inexpensive for hungry (and previously chronically malnourished!) working-class people in cities to buy meat and fresh produce.
Marxists themselves were perhaps the first to notice that the “proletariat” as their theory conceived it was vanishing, assimilated to the petty bourgeoisie by the postwar rise in living standards and the propagation of middlebrow culture through the then-new media of paperback books, radio, and television.
In the new environment, being “working class” became steadily less of a purchasing-power distinction and more one of culture, affiliation, and educational limits on upward mobility. A plumber might make more than an advertising copywriter per hour, but the copywriter could reasonably hope to run his own ad agency – or at least a corporate marketing department – some day. The plumber remained “working class” because, lacking his A-level, he could never hope to join the managerial elite.
At the same time, state socialism was becoming increasingly appealing to the managerial and upper classes because it offered the prospect not of revolution but of a managed economy that would freeze power relationships into a shape they were familiar with and knew how to manipulate. This came to be seen as greatly preferable to the chaotic dynamism of unrestrained free markets – and to upper-SES people who every year feared falling into poverty less but losing relative status more, it really was preferable.
In Great Britain, the formation of the National Health Service in 1947 was therefore not a radical move but a conservative one. It was a triumph not of revolutionary working-class fervor overthrowing elites but of managerial statism cementing elite power in place.
During the long recovery boom after World War II – until the early 1970s – it was possible to avoid noticing that the interests of the managerial elite and the working classes were diverging. Both the U.S. and Great Britain used their unmatched industrial capacity to act as price-takers in international markets, delivering profits fat enough to both buoy up working-class wages and blur the purchasing-power line between the upper-level managerial class and the owners of large capital concentrations almost out of existence.
The largest divergence was that the managerial elite, like capitalists before them, became de-localized and international. What mobility of money had done for the owners of capital by the end of the 19th century, mobility of skills did for the managerial class towards the end of the 20th.
As late as the 1960s, when I had an international childhood because my father was one of the few exceptions, the ability of capital owners to chase low labor costs was limited by the unwillingness of their hired managers to live and work outside their home countries.
The year my family returned to the U.S. for good – 1971 – was about the time the long post-war boom ended. The U.S. and Great Britain, exposed to competition (especially from a re-industrialized Germany and Japan) began a period of relative decline.
But while working-class wage gains were increasingly smothered, the managerial elite actually increased its ability to price-take in international markets after the boom. They became less and less tied to their home countries and communities – more willing and able to offshore not just themselves but working-class jobs as well. As that barrier eroded, the great hollowing out of the British industrial North and the American Rust Belt began.
The working class increasingly found itself trapped in dying towns. Where it wasn’t, credentialism often proved an equally effective barrier to upward mobility. My wife bootstrapped herself out of a hardscrabble working-class background after 1975 to become a partner at a law firm, but the way she did it would be unavailable to anyone outside the 1 in 100 of her peers at or above the IQ required to earn a graduate degree. She didn’t need that IQ to be a lawyer; she needed it to get the sheepskin that said she was allowed to be a lawyer.
The increasingly internationalized managerial-statist tribe traded increasingly in such permissions – both in getting them and in denying them to others. My older readers might be able to remember, just barely, when what medical treatment you could get was between you and your physician and didn’t depend on the gatekeeping of a faceless monitor at an insurance company.
Eventually, processing of those medical-insurance claims was largely outsourced to India. The whole tier of clerical jobs that had once been the least demanding white-collar work came under pressure from outsourcing and automation. effectively disappearing. This made the gap between working-class jobs and the lowest tier of the managerial elite more difficult to cross.
In this and other ways, the internationalized managerial elite grew more and more unlike a working class for which both economic and social life remained stubbornly local. Like every other ruling elite, as that distance increased it developed a correspondingly increasing demand for an ideology that justified that distinction and legitimized its power. And in the post-class-warfare mutations of Marxism, it found one.
Again, historical contingencies make this process easier to follow in Great Britain than its analog in the U.S. was. But first we need to review primordial Marxism and its mutations.
By “primordial Marxism” I mean Marx’s original theory of immiseration and class warfare. Marx believed, and taught, that increasing exploitation of the proletariat would immiserate it, building up a counterpressure of rage that would bring on socialist revolution in a process as automatic as a steam engine.
Inconveniently, the only place this ever actually happened was in a Communist country – Poland – in 1981. I’m not going to get into the complicated historiography of how the Soviet Revolution itself failed to fit the causal sequence Marx expected; consult any decent history. What’s interesting for our purposes is that capitalism accidentally solved the immiseration problem well before then, by abolishing Marx’s proletariat through rising standards of living – reverse immiseration.
The most forward-thinking Marxists had already figured out this was going to be a problem by around 1910. This began a century-long struggle to find a theoretical basis for socialism decoupled from Marxian class analysis.
Early, on, Lenin developed the theory of the revolutionary vanguard. In this telling, the proletariat was incapable of spontaneously respond to immiseration with socialist revolution but needed to be led to it by a vanguard of intellectuals and men of action which would, naturally, take a leading role in crafting the post-revolutionary paradise.
Only a few years later came one of the most virulent discoveries in this quest – Fascism. It is not simplifying much to say that Communists invented Fascism as an escape from the failure of class-warfare theory, then had to both fight their malignant offspring to death and gaslight everyone else into thinking that the second word in “National Socialism” meant anything but what it said.
During its short lifetime, Fascism did exert quite a fascination on the emerging managerial-statist elite. Before WWII much of that elite viewed Mussolini and Hitler as super-managers who Got Things Done, models to be emulated rather than blood-soaked tyrants. But Fascism’s appeal did not long survive its defeat.
Marxists had more success through replacing the Marxian economic class hierarchy with other ontologies of power in which some new victim group could be substituted for the vanished proletariat and plugged into the same drama of immiseration leading to inevitable revolution.
Most importantly, each of these mutations offered the international managerial elite a privileged role as the vanguard of the new revolution – a way to justify its supremacy and its embrace of managerial state socialism. This is how we got the Great Inversion – Marxists in the middle and upper classes, anti-Marxists in the working class being dismissed as gammons and deplorables.
Leaving out some failed experiments, we can distinguish three major categories of substitution. One, “world systems theory”, is no longer of more than historical interest. In this story, the role of the proletariat is taken by oppressed Third-World nations being raped of resources by capitalist oppressors.
Though world systems theory still gets some worship in academia, it succumbed to the inconvenient fact that the areas of the Third World most penetrated by capitalist “exploitation” tended to be those where living standards rose the fastest. The few really serious hellholes left are places (like, e,g. the Congo) where capitalism has been thwarted or co-opted by local bandits. But in general, Frantz Fanon’s wretched of the Earth are now being bourgeoisified as fast as the old proletariat was during and after WWII.
The other two mutations of Marxian vanguard theory were much more successful. One replaced the Marxian class hierarchy with a racialized hierarchy of victim groups. The other simply replaced “the proletariat” with “the environment”.
And now you know everything you need to understand who the Labor party of 2019 is and why it got utterly shellacked by actual labor. If you think back a bit, you can even understand Tony Blair.
For Tony Blair it was who first understood that the Labor Party’s natural future was as an organ not of the working class, but as a fully converged tool of the international managerial elite. Of those who think their justifying duty is to fight racism or sexism or cis-normativity or global warming and keep those ugly gammons firmly under their thumbs, rather than acting on the interests and the loudly expressed will of the British people.
Now you also know why in the Britain of 2019, the rhetoric of Marxism and state socialism issues not from assembly-line workers and plumbers and bricklayers, but from the chattering classes – university students, journalists and pundits, professional political activists, and the like.
This is the face of the Great Inversion – and its application to the politics of the U.S. is left as a very easy exercise.GGjestemedlem
Gjest
The maddest nanny-state ideas of 2019
From inedible eco-diets to bans on snacking, public-health campaigners outdid themselves this year.
https://www.spiked-online.com/2019/12/31/the-maddest-nanny-state-ideas-of-2019/
The nanny state has had a bit of a quiet year in the UK. With all the shenanigans over Brexit, it seems our parliamentarians haven’t really had the time to devote to making serious new dents in our personal freedoms. Given that, in recent years, we’ve seen the introduction of all sorts of bans, regulations and tax hikes on tobacco, minimum prices for booze north of the border, and sugary drinks taxes, maybe it was time to take a breather.
But that hasn’t stopped the public-health wonks, campaigners and academics from floating ever-more stupid and illiberal ideas about how our lives can be micromanaged. And if our behaviour can’t be changed, the authorities will simply apply pressure to the companies who make the products we consume.
Christmas time is always one for the old favourites, and one of the classics is food reformulation. This is the idea that if manufacturers would only tweak the recipes for our favourite foods, it would do wonders for the fight against obesity. Some things are (relatively) easy to tweak, like cutting the amount of salt in biscuits or crisps – up to a point. But other changes are easy to notice. You can’t easily replace sugar with artificial sweetener without anyone noticing. The likes of aspartame simply taste different and have nothing like the bulk of sugar. Diet drinks taste different to full-sugar drinks and you either tolerate that difference in flavour or you don’t. As long as you have the option, it really is a matter of taste.
But as AG Barr, maker of Scottish soft-drink favourite Irn-Bru, has found out, denying your customers that choice altogether in an effort to avoid the sugary drinks tax can seriously hurt your bottom line. The reduced-sugar version of Irn-Bru has been a flop. No wonder the firm suddenly discovered an old, very sugary recipe to flog as a ‘limited edition’ over Christmas and New Year.
Getting Whitehall involved in how our food is made is, er, a recipe for disaster (pun intended), as Josie Appleton found out while writing the report, Cooking For Bureaucrats. She notes that calorie-reduction targets have been proposed for a bizarre range of foods, including ‘olive ciabatta, boxed salads, sushi, bao buns, vegetable crisps, protein balls, yoghurt-covered raisins, croutons, braised cabbage, mushy peas, pesto, hollandaise sauce, quinoa (with additions), spelt and barley (with additions), guacamole, pease pudding, and prepared salads’. Hardly the most obviously unhealthy foods.
The real upshot of food reformulation is food that tastes worse – or comes in smaller portions because changing the recipe is just impractical. So, well done all concerned at making our lives just that little bit worse for practically zero impact on calorie intakes or obesity.
Another public-health crowdpleaser is the advertising ban. Earlier this year, London’s mayor, Sadiq Khan, promised to ban adverts for ‘junk’ food on Transport for London (TfL). But within weeks, we had news of collateral damage. Farmdrop, an organic-food home-delivery firm, were told by TfL bosses to cut out parts of an ad containing such treats as bacon, butter and jam. It even had to confirm that other foods featured, including shortbread, juice, biscuits, yoghurt and elderflower, were in compliance with the new rules. Advertising bans may be stupid, irrational and a restraint on free expression – but at least TfL’s rules have the merit of bone-headed consistency.
In 2019, we had the chance to examine the merits of nanny-state policies introduced in the previous year. For example, the stats on Scotland’s policy of minimum pricing for alcohol, introduced in May 2018, are now available and show alcohol sales are down. However, that seems little different to the long-term trend in Scotland. Initial estimates of mortality seems to show a decline – but there was also a decline in England.
Clearly, the policy has had either zero effect, or the effect is so marginal as to be indistinguishable from long-term trends. Minimum pricing has been bad news for anyone who likes a cheap drink and good news for booze shops just across the border in England. But it’s doing nothing (or at least, vanishingly little) to prevent booze-related deaths.
But if minimum pricing is pointless, that’s nothing next to the maddest of madcap public-health ideas: the diet proposed in January by the EAT-Lancet Commission, bringing together the biggest moonbats from the worlds of public health and climate-change activism – what I called at the time the ‘Avengers Assembled of food bollocks’. Our flatulent, eco-friendly food future should be built, we were told, on grains, fruit and vegetables. These could be supplemented by a small amount of milk and cheese, but that’s about it. The diets suggests just seven grams of pork or beef per day (a quarter of an ounce in old money). Luckily, there is the option of a whole ounce (28 grams) of chicken per day and a wondrous 1.5 eggs per week each. The potato ration would be just 50 grams per day.
Of course, this is the most echoing of echo chambers, a committee of the great and good cooking up dietary drivel between themselves. No normal person would even attempt to eat such a diet. The danger is that having set the mark for utter dietary nonsense, politicians might be persuaded to accept a diet with slightly fewer restrictions as somehow rational.
Finally, a word for those we have lost this year. No, not an obituary, but a fond farewell to the retired chief medical officer, Dame Sally Davies, aka the ‘Nanny-in-Chief’. As Christopher Snowdon has pointed out, Davies was appointed in 2010 and was, for a few years, relatively sensible. But after half a decade of pickling in the asylum-like world of public health, she started coming out with statements about how she worried about breast cancer every time she had a glass of wine. Her parting shot on retiring was to call for a ban on pretty much all eating and drinking on public transport. It was for the benefit of everyone that she was put out to pasture.
While Christmas at Chez Davies may be more paltry than poultry, to everyone else – a merry Christmas and a happy, indulgent New Year!
The moment occurred on September 24, 1599. In a timbered building off Moorgate Fields, not far from where Shakespeare was struggling to complete Hamlet, a new type of company was founded. Its ownership of the new firm, called the East India Company, was sliced into tiny pieces to be bought and sold freely.
Tradable shares allowed private corporations to become larger and more powerful than states. Liberalism’s fatal hypocrisy was to celebrate the virtuous neighborhood butchers, bakers, and brewers in order to defend the worst enemies of free markets: the East India Companies that know no community, respect no moral sentiments, fix prices, gobble up competitors, corrupt governments, and make a mockery of freedom.
https://www.project-syndicate.org/c...-93835001&mc_cid=9877c05d48&mc_eid=80ac38d9f2
So what. Ingen liker monopoler, statlige som private. Derfor har man regler for slikt i frie demokratier.
har vi?
Monopollovgiving, reguleringer, internasjonale avtaler (EU, EFTA, OPEC ++++). Et eks kan være internasjonale avtaler om fiskerier. At det finnes banditter som ikke bryr seg om dette er vanlig kriminalitet.
Tidene da private firmaer kunne drive på som de ville er for lengst over. Hva enkelte stater gjør er en annen sak.
det må du jo gjerne tro.
Dette var jo et "saklig" svar og gir ingen mening.GGjestemedlem
Gjest
Many countries have broad laws that protect consumers and regulate how companies operate their businesses. The goal of these laws is to provide an equal playing field for similar businesses that operate in a specific industry while preventing them from gaining too much power over their competition. Simply put, they stop businesses from playing dirty in order to make a profit. These are called antitrust laws.
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/09/antitrust-law.asp
så fint.
(jeg fikk dessverre ikke anledning til å delta på disse informasjonskursene på askøy)
Her rår trollingen. Total mangel på argumentasjon. Kun fjollete kommentarer.
Dette er Deffe sin tråd, og den skal han få styre som han vil for min del. Det er alt for mykje engelskspråkleg propagandastoff å lese... liknar litt på norsktekstar av elevar før kofirmasjonsalder...
selvfølgelig. hva hadde du forventet?
selv barn vet at det fins antitrustlover; men brukes de? og når de brukes, brukes de mot slike økonomiske kolosser som amazon, google osv, eller mot de selvstendige næringsdrivende som jobber for slike selskap som f. eks. airbnb i deres forsøk på å forenes i en felles front mot slike selskap? (https://prospect.org/economy/double-standard-antitrust-law/) (warrens program om å splitte opp gigantene blir jo av askøypartiet og andre ansett som ren kommunisme)
mange land kaller seg demokratiske. usa f. eks.. noen er likevel mer å anse som oligarkier i form av plutokratier; de er i praksis inverterte totalitære regimer. (https://www.hifisentralen.no/forumet/off-topic-hja-rnet/81490-a-54.html#post3013680)
nå sist avviste eu en lovgivning som skulle forhindre skatteundragelse (https://www.hifisentralen.no/forumet/off-topic-hja-rnet/97221-eu-quo-vadis.html#post2997156)
en trenger ikke være enige i slikt, men en er ganske ute å kjøre ved å tro at det ikke er problemer her. men de forsvinner jo, så lenge vi har antitrustlover og demokratier, må vite.
derfor!Sist redigert:
den er blitt stjålet!
Ingen systemer er perfekte. Alle politiske og økonomiske systemer innebærer en del svakheter.
Kapitalismen kan lede til en viss grad av skjevfordeling. Derfor regulerer man den. Feil i andre politiskøkonomiske system gidder jeg ikke å nevne, listen blir lang.
Et par stikkordtar jeg med: Priser, incitament og troverdige institusjoner
type kommentar: ingen systemer er perfekte. (jeg unnlater å bruke betegnelsen fjollet)
er dette hva en kaller problembevissthet?
ferdig med denne øvelsen, får jeg håpe.UUtgatt24668
Gjest
Vedrørende bevegelser i stemmekveget.
- Jeg tror saueflokken har blitt mer polarisert og beveger seg bort fra etablerte styringspartier - derfor vil det gjerne være mer mennesker med egen hjerne som sitter igjen i labour / AP eller Høyre for den del - mens flokken er blitt mer dratt til ytterpunktene.
Her hjemme er populismen til SP og MDG gode eksempler på partier med ingen bærekraftige løsninger men kun fjollete symbolpolitikk basert på enkeltutsagn.
USA trenger ingen kommentar. Og SD i Sverige likeså.
Vedrørende monopol - vi har for mange monopoler i dag som ikke teknisk sett er monopoler men type Google og Facebook som også er skadelig for forbrukeren - så det er ikke slik at sosialismen alene står for uheldige utslag.
Det jeg liker mer og mer med sosialismen er troen på medmenneskelighet og en god fordelingspolitikk - det jeg fordømmer er det destruktive mot verdiskapning. Jeg tror det finnes en løsning i mellom. Mye av det vi kaller sosialisme i Norge - der f eks mange statlige ansatte beskyttes - er ikke å ta vare på svake mennesker eller de som trenger det - men en ren mafiavirksomhet og egoisme.UUtgatt24668
Gjest
FrP er litt forglemmelig ettersom de over lang tid har hatt sviktende oppslutning - og de var populistene i de gode og gamle dagene der de var en slags protest mot de etablerte styringspartiene. Dessuten fungerer innvandringskortet mindre og mindre, og man kan egentlig lure på om vi snakker populisme lenger.
Det farlige i Norge framover er spenningen mellom SP og MDG som står for totalt motsatt politikk med få unntak - og med et sterkt svekket styringsparti på laget, AP. Jeg ser bort fra kristenfundamentalistene KrF ettersom de er ute snart og godt er det.UUtgatt24668
Gjest
Nå har jeg ikke et veldig stort behov for å forsvare SV men de prøver i det minste å ha en rød tråd i sin politikk. MDG har en illusjon om en rød tråd - mens SP snur kappen etter vinden hele tiden uten noe begrep om økonomi eller ideologi.SSlubbert
Gjest
Senterpartiet sin ideologi er vel å være mot alt som er nytt og moderne.
Jeg har alltid syntes "populisme"-begrepet er nokså ullent, men der SP har tatt over for FrP er i så spille på frykt, spesielt frykt for forandring. Og det er jo et ganske sterkt menneskelig instinkt.SSlubbert
Gjest
Den ultimate populismen må jo være direktedemokrati? Sveits må være superpopulistisk, som har folkeavstemminger om alt mulig? Eller betyr populisme at man spiller på frykt, heller enn det at man følger folkeviljen i seg selv? Feks vet vi jo at det ville blitt katastrofe om "folket" (flertallet) skulle hatt feks. direkte kontroll over statsbudsjettet, siden de fleste (meg selv inkludert) ikke har økonomisk kompetanse til å kunne styre landets økonomi. Men samtidig er demokrati et veldig positivt ladet ord, mer så enn teknokrati eller plutokrati. Vi har jo en slags blanding av demokrati med valgte politikere, og teknokrati med embetsmenn som i praksis har mye av styringsmakten. Og for så vidt plutokrati siden de rike kjøper seg innflytelse. Men det langt fra gitt at rent demokrati/direktedemokrati ville fungert noe bedre. Det blir jo fryktelig populistisk.
SP er ikke imot forandring til det bedre...
Civitas har en god artikkel om populsime:
https://www.civita.no/politisk-ordbok/hva-er-populisme
'
Alle ideologier kan ha populistiske innslag, men jeg synes nok ikke nødvendigvis SV er det partiet som fremstår som mest populistisk om man tar denne artikkelen på alvor.
"Populismens fremste problem er at den lett tenderer mot det illiberale. Et begrep som har blitt benyttet i snever forstand, er “autoritær populisme”. Denne kan gjenkjennes i fire hovedtrekk: a) en politisk fantasi basert på et (kulturelt/etnisk/politisk) homogent folk eller klasse b) at dette fellesskapet har en allmenn vilje som kan implementeres politisk c) at politiske løsninger bryter radikalt med liberal pluralisme og toleranse d) at polemikken er konspiratorisk og ubegrunnet."
Dette er bare en av flere formuleringer i denne artikkelen som innebærer at påstanden om SV som et særdeles populistisk parti ikke står seg særlig bra.
For eksempel denne: "Populister mangler gjerne en substansiell ideologi og kan sies å være anti-intellektuell. De spiller på emosjonelle enkeltsaker og har gjerne en vidløftig økonomisk politikk."SSlubbert
Gjest
Hvis du slår sammen "forandring til det bedre" med "alt var bedre før", så blir det i praksis det jeg skrev.
^ Som populistene i Venstre og Høyre, som i ramme alvor mener at å avkriminalisere bruk av narkotika er en smart ting. Lurt å la ungdom få gjøre som de vil- uten konsekvenser. Liberalismen er så absolutt proppfull av populisme.
Venstre har jeg gitt opp å forstå, for lenge siden. Høyre derimot?? Det finnes ingen logisk, nei fornuftig, forklaring. Hvis man da ikke skal anta at de er så kyniske at de regner med at det er lettere å få stemmer fra dophuer enn fra oppegående folk!
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^For Høyre tror jeg antallet stemmer er viktigere enn hvem som avgir stemmene. Etter valget spiller det ingen rolle.
Ser det er flere enn meg som blir oppgitt og frustrert over at de partiene vi pleide stemme på har glemt hva de står for- og hvorfor. Ikke rart det blir økt polarisering blant velgerne.
Hvor ble det av ideologi, som gjorde at man alltid kunne stole på hva de enkelte partiene sto for?
Vi treng kanskje nye parti - ikkje berre nye politikarar
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Kommer ikke det helt an på hva man gjør i stedet? Kan det ikke tenkes at en korreksjon er bedre dersom man kommer skjevt ut enn å legge framtidsmulighetene i ruiner gjennom kriminalisering? Som man er inne på i en annen tråd så er det sterk sammenheng mellom psykiske problemer og rusmisbruk. Rus brukes ofte for å døyve psykisk smerte. Kanskje er ikke straffeforfølgelse og fengsel den rette medisinen.
Ruspolitikk bør baseres på vitenskap, akkurat som annen politikk.
ansatt eller selvstendig næringdrivende… utbyttingen blir ikke borte av den grunn.
Corporations are keen to dissolve the boundary between traditional employment and independent contracting. As Mr. Martín watched his work dwindle, his employer, Marriott, and its competitor Hilton looked to Silicon Valley. In 2017 and 2018, according to the National Employment Law Project, the two hotel giants joined with their nemesis Airbnb and the TechNet coalition (including Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, Uber, Lyft, TaskRabbit and many other “innovation” companies), to lobby for a federal bill, the NEW GIG Act, that would, among other things, effectively convert anyone who finds work through an online “platform” into an independent contractor.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/10/...l?action=click&module=Opinion&pgtype=HomepageGGjestemedlem
Gjest
Historisk har det vært de kristne og konservative som vil bruke død, straff og pinsler for mennesker som søker rus og utvidet forståelse.
Jeg er glad for at regjeringen leder oss til en bedre fremtid.
https://hoyre.no/aktuelt/nyheter/20...k&utm_campaign=200109_hoyre_&utm_content=feed
Krf, Frp og Sp er naturligvis på bakbena... men det er jo en definisjon av dem på mange måter.
Men i denne saken så finnes det allierte på begge sider av kløften, og det er en god menneskelig sak der liberalere fra høyresiden og alternativere fra venstresiden kan finne sammen. Vi ønsker alle et felles mål med respekt for mennesket og mindre overgrep fra oven, politikere, staten og selvforherligende moralistiske løyntnater.
Det er mye tøv i denne debatten. Tunge rusmisbrukere er vel de fleste enige om at trenger hjelp, ikke straff. Men at de som enda ikke har begynt skal få inntrykk av at bruk er helt greit, er noe helt annet. Samme med de som nettopp har startet. Her holder det ikke med frivillig oppmøte til en samtale. Det gir sterke signaler om at bruk av natkotika er opp til den enkelte.Rart at man tviholder på å straffeforfølge narkomane til tross for at det beviselig ikke fungerer. Å ha vitenskapen i ryggen blir stemplet som populistisk.
Men er det slik i dag? Tunge rusmisbrukere blir jo til stadighet jaget fra sted til sted av politiet.UUtgatt24668
Gjest
Vi er allerede der at unge bruker narkotiske stoffer utover alkohol - og det er meningsløst å straffe den uheldige som blir tatt. Dessuten er det ikke utelukkende negativt at alkoholen byttes ut til fordel for potensielt mindre skadelige stoffer
Det er mye tøv i denne debatten. Tunge rusmisbrukere er vel de fleste enige om at trenger hjelp, ikke straff. Men at de som enda ikke har begynt skal få inntrykk av at bruk er helt greit, er noe helt annet. Samme med de som nettopp har startet. Her holder det ikke med frivillig oppmøte til en samtale. Det gir sterke signaler om at bruk av natkotika er opp til den enkelte.Rart at man tviholder på å straffeforfølge narkomane til tross for at det beviselig ikke fungerer. Å ha vitenskapen i ryggen blir stemplet som populistisk.
UUtgatt24668
Gjest
Populisme er flere ting:
- et ord politikere bruker til å undergrave / snakke ned sine konkurrenter uansett om det er hold i det eller ikke
- å komme med lettvinte løsninger og snakke folk i munnen uten at det er realisme i dette eller økonomisk hold i argumentet (type Sp som later som at vi har ubegrenset med penger)
- å fremme fordommer og kunnskapsløshet i folket - type Tyskland og jødehat på 30-tallet. -
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